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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JAMES R. KNIGHT, j 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ( 
vs. Case No. 
CLYDE C. PATTERSON and 11 10861 
ORMOND KONKLE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action brought by plaintiff to recover 
from defendants the following: an accounting for a 
one-third ( 1/3) interest in a motel in West Yellow-
stone. Montana; damages for conversion of personal 
property; wages earned but unpaid; damages for def a· 
mation. The plaintiff pursued recovery of the above 
by filing a Complaint containing four ( 4) causes of 
action, the fourth cause of action being before this court 
on review. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COl'RT 
The case was heard upon a motion for s . ununar1 
Judgment by defendant on the 10th dav of F b· · . . ., ,, e ruar1· 
1967, on plamtiff s fourth cause of action. The H · 
O!l11r. 
able Ferdinand Erickson found that any stat emtnr1 
made by defendant, PATTERSON, were subject t 
the defense of truth and within the area of qua!" n:ec; 
privilege. Pursuant to said finding, the def enda ·' . f,L\ 
motion for summary judgment was granted and plau
1
• 
tiff's fourth cause of action was dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, plaintiff seeks a reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court granting defendants' rn(I. 
tion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and defendant, CLYDE C. PAT 
TERSON, the latter hereinafter referred to as PAT-
TERSON, on or about the 1st day of May, 1963, 
entered into an oral agreement in Ogden, Utah, where· 
by they were to purchase a motel located in '\Vest Yel· 
lowstone, Montana. A Uniform Real Estate Contrac' 
was negotiated with plaintiff and PATTERSOX 
listed as purchasers thereon. (R-9. Defendants' answer 
to interrogatory 2 (b) ) . After various investments 
had been made by the parties, the plaintiff undertool 
the management of said motel at an agreed week!) 
2 
wage. On or about November 4, 1963, a one-third ( 1/3) 
interest in said motel was conveyed to ORMOND 
hOKKLE, co-defendant herein. (R-9. Defendants' 
answer to interrogatory No. 4.) 
The plaintiff managed the motel during 1963 and 
!964 aud the wages earned but unpaid were credited 
to his investment in the motel venture. Upon plain-
tiff's return to \Vest Yellowstone, Montana, to manage 
the motel in the spring of 1965, plaintiff was told that 
he had been replaced as the manager. Plaintiff was 
r(fused the right to remove his personal property 
located at the motel, which was later destroyed or lost, 
and was refused any payment of wages and/or an ac-
counting of his interest in the motel venture. During 
1965, PATERSON published to several persons in 
Ogden, Utah, and West Yellowstone, Montana, de-
famatory statements to the effect that the plaintiff 
had embezzled motel monies belonging to the motel 
venture. 
On the 3rd day of January, 1967, defendants filed 
a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff's 
fourth cause of action (R-13). The court, on the 10th 
day of February, 1967, after arguments of counsel, 
granted defendants' motion. The court expressly held 
that "Any statements made by the defendants to third 
parties involving any misuse, misapplication or em-
bezzlement of motel funds, or words of similar import, 
were subject to the defense of truth and were within 
the area of qualified privilege." (R-18). 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING Df_ 
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR S UM MAH\· 
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL OF PLAe.;. 
TIFF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION, As 
THERE REMAINED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACTS AND THE DEFEKDAXT 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT A~ 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff will limit the points of argument m thi~ 
brief to the error as claimed in point two (2) of plain-
tiff's statement of points. 
The sole issue before this court is whether the lower 
court was justified in its finding that no material que1. 
tions of fact existed and that the defendant was en-
titled to judgment as a matter of law. The District 
Court expressly held that "Any statements made by 
defendant to third parties were subject to the defense 
of truth and were within the area of qualified privilege.' 
(R-18). 
It is the plaintiff's contention that the lower court, 
in finding "truth" as an affirmative defense, had no 
basis for its finding that the plaintiff had embezzled 
motel monies. Embezzlement is generally defined as 
the fraud-ulent or felonious conversion of property 
which has rightfully come into the possession of the 
converter. (State v. Taylor, 14 U. 2d 107, 378 P. 2d. 
4 
:l,i:?. ~ ·what nidence was available to the court when 
,t utacle its finding? The defendant filed an affidavit 
i•.it'.i :tttaclied exhibits and a statement from ARTHUR 
! . e,\ )lPBELL, in support of his motion for sum-
inan· jt1clgment. (R-13). In addition to the above, the 
tllll;t bad before it the pleadings, interrogatories and 
request~ for admissions. I submit that there are no 
1,jw1ssions of fact, either in the answers to defendants' 
1\lerrogatories ( R-7) or the answers to defendants' 
i·fqLtesb for admissions, upon which the lower court's 
\·:din~· can be justified. Upon what basis then did the 
~· 1urt rind in defendants' favor? 
From the record, it would appear that the lower 
l't'urt accepted as true the self serving statements of 
J'.\TTERSON as contained in his affidavit and the 
;,ttached exhibits. ( R-13) . In doing so, the lower court 
cnust have disregarded the plaintiff's counter-affidavit. 
iJ{-17). Should not the District Court have viewed the 
plaintiff's affidavit in the more favorable light? Had 
it done so, the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment would have been denied because the question of 
embezzlement would thus have been put at issue. 
This court has often stated that the remedy of 
summary judgment is a harsh remedy and has often 
rxpressed a reluctance to affirm the granting of such 
a motion. (Strand v. Mayne, 14 U. 2d 355, 384 P. 2d. 
39(), and Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 U. 2d. 40, 
:JH8 P. 2d 266) . 
In the case of Tangren v. lngal~, 12 U. 2d. 388, 
5 
367 P. 2d 179, and cases there cited, this court di' 
. . scussed 
the grantmg of a summary Judgment using the f 11 . 0 0\\. 
mg language found at p. 185: 
"The privilege of presenting evidence sh I' 
be denied only when, taking the view most f ou 0 
bl h , l . l avor. a e to t e party s c aims, 1e could not in . 
event establish a right to redress under the l:~.l. 
and unless it clearly so appears, that doubt 
should be resolved in favor of permitting h' 
to go to trial." un 
Further, this court, in the Frederick May & Co. 
case, (supra), although upholding the lower court's 
summary judgment, nonetheless suggested that it would 
have been more wise for the trial court to have denied 
the Summary Judgment where complicated legal ques-
tions were presented and to have determined the issue 
of fact by trial. The reason this court gave for the aboYe 
suggestion was that if such procedure had been followed 
then this court could review the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's finding. While on 
appeal from a summary judgment the court would be 
required to review the evidence in the light most favor· 
able to the losing party. Based upon the foregoing this 
court must now review the evidence presented to the 
lower court in the most favorable light for the plaintiff. 
It was the plaintiff's contention, as evidenced by 
his affidavit, that PATTERSON was informed of all 
actions taken by the plaintiff in the management of the 
motel in question. (R-17). This would include the 
transactions referred to in defendants' affidavits and 
6 
;\i•"l' c,·idence<l by the exhibits attached thereto. (R-
1 .. 1 • There was 110 attempt on the plaintiff's part to 
,inlJCzzlc woncy belonging to the motel and there is 
1111 1111co11troverted evidence in the record to substan-
: i:t ll' ~ueh a claim. Thus, the question of embezzlement 
,htJuld ha H' been determined by the trier of fact. 
( )n the question of the court's finding of a qualified 
pnidegc. this language found in 33 Am. J ur. "Libel 
.ind Slander", Section 126, page 124, is pertinent: 
"The essential elements of a conditionally 
privileged communication may accordingly be 
enumerated as good faith, an interest to be up-
held, a statement limited in its scope to this pur-
pose, a proper occasion, and publication in a 
proper manner and to proper parties only." 
There is nothing in the record of this case which 
would justify the court's finding of the existence of 
a qualified privilege. The elements of a conditionally 
privileged communication, as mentioned above, might 
conceirnbly be found to exist in the statement of 
jJffHUR F. CA~1PBELL. However, any such 
rinding \vould necessarily be limited in scope to the 
publication made by PATTERSON to ARTilUR 
F. CAMPBELL and would not extend to any other 
parties to whom defamatory statements were published. 
Further. assuming that the lower court could find the 
rlements necessary for the existence of a qualified privi-
lege the plaintiff by alleging "malice'' places in issue 
the question of defendants' "good faith". Here again 
7 
the court is faced with a genuine issue of fact h. 
W !tr 
must be determined by jury. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in granting the motion of the defendant, CLYDE ( 
PATTERSON, for summary judgment and that thi 
court's order should be reversed and the case remanded 
to the District Court for trial on the issues of truil, 
and conditional privilege. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MATT BILJANIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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